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INTRODUCTION
Computer simulations and modeling' can provide significant evidence to a trier of fact. Typically, a party retains an expert who
1. Simulations and modeling mathematically predict how a phenomenon has or will
occur based on assumptions. Simulations and modeling are extremely sophisticated and
are as much an art as a science. See I. MITRANI, SIMULATION TECHNIQUES FOR DISCRETE
EVENT SYSTEMS 1-3 (1982). Computers are useful in simulating and modeling because
they can be programmed to manipulate the large number of input data and mathematical
instructions which are usually necessary. Examples of simulations and models are found
in: Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer Co., 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976), cert denied, 429 U.S.
987 (1976) (in breach of contract action, computer simulation used to prove that an automotive anti-skid device could be perfected); Pearl Brewing Co. v. Jos. Schliz Brewing Co.,
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prepares a simulation and testifies at trial based on conclusions drawn
from the simulation. In cross-examining the expert, the opposing party
attempts to show that the simulation does not support the expert's conclusion because one or more of the assumptions on which the simulation is based is incorrect. 2
The ability of the opposing party to expose unsupported conclusions
or inaccurate simulations depends, to a great extent, on the thoroughness of pretrial discovery of the expert, and disclosure by the expert at
trial. Despite the importance of discovery of the expert, courts vary on
the amount of disclosure required.
An extraordinary example of a court limiting the requirement of
disclosure is found in Perma Research & Development v. Singer Co. 3 In
Perma, the Second Circuit affirmed a judgment for nearly $7,000,000 for
defendant's breach of an alleged agreement to use best efforts to perfect
an automotive anti-skid device. Plaintiff's evidence was provided almost exclusively by testimony of two expert witnesses. Their testimony
was based on the results of a computer simulation developed by one of
the experts to determine if the anti-skid device could be perfected.
When defendant asked plaintiff's expert witness to disclose the underlying data and theorems employed in the computer simulation, he refused on the ground that it was his "private work product" and
proprietary information. 4 Defendant was not allowed access to the
program.
On appeal, the majority held that defendant "had not shown that it
did not have an adequate basis on which to cross-examine plaintiff's experts." One judge dissented.6 He stated that considering the complex415 F. Supp. 1122 (S.D. Tex. 1976) (econometric model used to simulate market conditions
in appropriate sub-markets in antitrust action).
2. Designing an accurate simulation involves mathematically modeling the phenomenon (including picking meaningful input data), incorporating the model into a computer
program, and verifying the program by comparing its output with empirical data. Examples of inaccurate assumptions include using linear functions where there are substantial
nonlinearities, and incorrectly assuming that a particular parameter is independent of another parameter. J. SMrrH, MATHEMATICAL MODELING AND DIGITAL SIMULATION FOR EN-

GINEERS AND SCIENTISTS (1977). The results of a simulation of an automotive anti-skid
device might be inaccurate if the program assumed constant coefficients of friction where
they were actually heat sensitive, or the input data was only valid for dry pavement. See
generally A. LAW & W. KELTON, SIMULATION MODELING AND ANALYSIS (1982).

3. 542 F.2d 111 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976).
4. Id. at 124. Neither the trial judge nor the majority stated any legal theory under
which plaintiff's expert's program should be protected.
5. Id. at 115. While it is not known what defendant asserted on appeal, defendant
could not comprehensively attack a complex simulation without knowing the assumptions
it was based on. The majority stated "it might have been better practice for opposing
counsel to arrange for the delivery of all details of the underlying data and theorems employed in these simulations in advance of trial to ... avoid unnecessarily belabored discus-
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ity of computer simulations and automobile anti-skid systems, the
expert's lack of disclosure was a prejudicial error because defendant
could not properly attack the credibility of the computer simulation on
cross-examination. 7 He further stated that "it is of utmost importance
that appropriate standards be set for the introduction of computerized
evidence."8
This Note will argue that, while not perfect, the Federal Rules of
Evidence (FRE) and the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP) provide an outline for the standards of the discovery of computer simulations. Extensive pretrial discovery of details of an expert witness'
computer simulation should be liberally permitted within the context of
FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) so that opposing counsel can effectively cross-examine an expert at trial.
Part I of the Note will discuss the extent of a court's discretion in
controlling the cross-examination of experts at trial. It will then explain the roles of probity of evidence, jury confusion, and judicial economy in determining how much underlying detail an expert must
disclose upon cross-examination. Part II will discuss the court's discretion in allowing pretrial discovery of the details of an expert's computer
simulation. Additionally, Part II will compare the role of pretrial discovery with trial disclosure, and show that pretrial disclosure is essential for effective cross-examination and for judicial economy. Part III
will argue that an expert should be foreclosed from introducing evidence at trial which was not disclosed prior to trial, provided a proper
request for discovery was made.
I.

DISCLOSURE DURING TRIAL

FRE 702-705 provide guidelines for expert testimony and cross-examination at trial. Under these rules, federal district court judges have
considerable discretion in determining the admissibility of expert testimony and the disclosure that an expert must make upon cross9
examination.
FRE 70210 establishes that, where specialized knowledge will assist
Id. In both the trial and appellate
sion of highly technical, tangential issues at trial....
opinions, it is not clear to what extent defendant requested and received simulation details during pretrial discovery. Under the principles developed in this Note, a court is not
obligated to waste trial time to allow a party to become familar with computer simulations that it should have learned of during pretrial discovery.
6. J. Van Graafeiland.
7. Perma, 542 F.2d at 121-26.
8. Id. at 124.
9. Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 271 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907
(1976).
10. FED. R. EVID. 702 states: "If scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge
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a trier of fact, an expert may testify concerning that knowledge in the
form of opinion or otherwise. The court must make a threshold deterirunation under FRE 702 whether the expert is qualified to testify as an
expert because of his "knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education."" Beyond this threshold, an expert's lack of qualifications affects
12
only the weight to be given to his testimony.
FRE 70313 provides that facts or data relied on by an expert in
forming opinions or inferences need not be admissible in evidence if the
facts or data are a type reasonably relied on other experts in the particular field.
FRE 70514 determines that, within the court's discretion, an expert
may testify as to his or her opinion and give reasons for it without prior
disclosure of the underlying facts or data. While the expert may be required to divulge the data on which the opinion is based during crossexamination, the elimination of preliminary disclosure under FRE 703
and 705 allow the trial court more control over the amount and detail of
5
evidence offered at trial.'
A.

ADMISSIBILITY UNDER

FRE 705

Unless the court directs otherwise, FRE 705 authorizes an expert to
give opinion testimony prior to disclosing the underlying facts and data
used to reach the opinion. The purpose is to make expert testimony
more understandable to a trier of fact. An expert is allowed to offer an
opinion without encumbering and obscuring it with details used in arriving at the opinion.16 The second sentence of FRE 705, however,
will assist the trier of fact to understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue, a
witness qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training, or education may
testify thereto in the form of an opinion or otherwise."
11. Admiral Theatre Corp. v. Douglas Theatre Co., 437 F. Supp. 1268, 1297 (D. Neb.
1977), modified, 585 F.2d 877 (8th Cir. 1978).
12. Id.
13. FED. R. EVID. 703 states:
The facts or data in the particular case upon which an expert bases an opinion or
inference may be those perceived by or made known to him at or before the
hearing. If of a type reasonably relied upon by experts in the particular field in
forming opinions or inferences upon the subject, the facts or data need not be admissible in evidence.
14. FED. R. EVID. 705 states: "The expert may testify in terms of opinion or inference
and give his reasons therefor without prior disclosure of the underlying facts or data, unless the court requires otherwise. The expert may in any event be required to disclose the
underlying facts or data on cross-examination."
15. FED. R. EVID. 705 advisory committee's note.
16. FED. R. EvID. 705 was specifically designed to avoid the need for hypothetical
questions. The "hypothetical question asks the expert to assume as true certain enumerated facts which are in evidence and could be found true by the trier. [The] expert [then
gives] his opinion based on the facts... [and] the trier may then accept the opinion if the
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states that an expert "may" be required to disclose the underlying facts
17
and data upon cross-examination.
Underlying facts and data are subject to cross-examination.' 8 In
fact, "unduly harsh limitation on cross-examination of a key expert witness can amount to prejudicial error." 19 In determining whether to allow an expert to testify to the facts underlying an opinion, the court
must consider whether the testimony should be excluded under FRE
403. Exclusion is warranted where the testimony's probative value is
outweighed by such dangers as confusion of the issues, misleading the
20
jury, or wasting the court's time.
To avoid confusing the jury and wasting the court's time, opposing
counsel must be prepared to cross-examine an expert witness concerning specific, relevant underlying facts and data. The advisory committee notes to FRE 705 establish that advance preparation is necessary:
If the objection is made that leaving it to the cross-examiner to
bring out the supporting data is essentially unfair, the answer is that he
is under no compulsion to bring out any facts or data except those unfavorable to the opinion. The answer assumes that the cross-examiner
has advance knowledge which is essential for effective cross-examination.... Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, as revised, provides for substantial discovery in this area .... 21
B.

ADMISSIBILITY UNDER FRE 703

FRE 703 authorizes an expert to testify in terms of opinion based
on facts and data not necessarily admissible into evidence, if of a type
reasonably relied on by experts in the particular field. 22 The court must
23
determine whether the facts and data are of such type.
For example, an expert, within limits, is allowed to testify based on
trier finds" the facts true. 11 J. Moore & H. Bendix, Moore's Federal Practice, section
705.10, at VII-71 (2d ed. 1985). ,
Hypothetical questions were often so long and detailed that juries could not follow
the question or understand the expert's answer. See, e.g., Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626
F.2d 784, 791 (10th Cir. 1980) ("A hypothetical question was propounded to a physician
....
The question took half an hour to propound; it was necessarily long because plaintiff's medical history was long. It was objected that a few of the multitudinous statements

of the hypothesis lacked meticulous accuracy.")
17. FED. R. EvID. 705.

18. Maatschappij Voor Industriele Waarden v. A.O. Smith Corp., 590 F.2d 415, 421 (2d
Cir. 1978).
19. Id.
20. United States v. Gillis, 773 F.2d 549, 554 (4th Cir. 1985).
21.
22.
by FRE
23.

FED. R. EVID. 705 (Advisory Committee's note).
Whether the expert must disclose what these facts and opinions are is governed
705. FED. R. EVID. 703 (Advisory Committee's note).
American Bearing Co. v. Litton Industries, 540 F. Supp. 1163, 1169 (E.D. Pa. 1982),

aff'd, 729 F.2d 943 (3d Cir. 1984), cert. denied, 469 U.S. 854 (1984).
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hearsay, which is usually inadmissable evidence. It is assumed the expert possesses the skill to properly evaluate hearsay in his area of expertise, and weigh it appropriately under the circumstances. 24 FRE 703
was designed to "bring the judicial practice into line with the practice of
the experts themselves when not in court. '25 For example:
a physician in his own practice bases his diagnosis on information from
numerous sources, [most of which would be admissible in evidence only
after a substantial authentication process,] yet the physician makes lifeand-death decisions in reliance upon them. His validation, expertly
performed and subject to cross-examination, ought to suffice for judi26
cial purposes.
Yet, where the individual expert witness relies on facts and data that
are not in evidence, and experts in the field would not reasonably rely
upon those facts and data, the expert witness' testimony does not, in the
27
absence of other indicia, have the requisite trustworthiness.
In determining whether facts and data are reasonably relied upon
by experts in the field, the courts must make a preliminary factual inquiry, out of the jury's presence, under FRE 104(a). 28 Ordinary rules of
evidence do not apply during this inquiry. "[T]he judge will of necessity
receive evidence pro and con on the issue. ' 29 Opposing counsel is present when a party presents its evidence. This, in effect, provides disclosure of underlying facts and data of the expert's simulation not
otherwise obtainable by opposing counsel. The amount of disclosure
that a party must make during the FRE 104 inquiry depends upon the
criteria the court uses to determine whether facts are reasonably relied
upon.
Several approaches have been used to determine whether the facts
and data are reasonably relied upon by experts in the field. Elements
of these approaches include assessing the reliability of the expert's opinion and its foundation, 30 determining whether there are facts in the rec24. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1245 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
25.

FED. R. EVID. 703 (Advisory Committee's notes).

26. Id.
27. In re "Agent Orange," 611 F. Supp. at 1245.
28. FED. R. EVID. 104(a) states:
Preliminary questions concerning the qualifications of a person to be a witness,
the existence of a privilege, or the admissibility of evidence shall be determined
by the court, subject to the provisions of subdivision (b). In making its determination it is not bound by the rules of evidence except those with respect to

privileges.
29. FED. R. EVID. 104 (Advisory Committee's notes).
30. See Soden v. Freightliner Corp., 714 F.2d 498, 503 (5th Cir. 1983) (expert testi-

mony in products liability case not reasonably relied on under FRE 703 because data was
provided by sister company in anticipation of litigation without explanation as to method
of gathering data); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1244
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ord to support the expert's opinion, 3 ' and whether there is any proof
offered to show that the opinion is reasonably relied on.32
The various approaches used by courts can be broadly classified into
two views. The more restrictive view requires the trial court to determine not only whether the data are of a type reasonably relied on by
experts in the field, but also whether the underlying data are trustworthy for hearsay or other reasons. The more liberal view allows the expert to base an opinion on data of the type reasonably relied on without
separately determining the trustworthiness of the particular data
33
involved.
The more liberal view is in harmony with the intent of FRE 703.
The guarantee of trustworthiness is that the data be of a type reasonably relied on by experts in the field. A further requirement of trustworthiness is not required by the rule. For the same reason, assessing
the reliability of the foundation, or determining whether there are facts
already in the record is not required by FRE 703.
The following cases illustrate some of the approaches used by
courts to determine whether facts and data are reasonably relied upon
under FRE 703. In Soden v. FreightlinerCorp.,3 the Fifth Circuit affirmed the trial court's decision to exclude under FRE 703 an expert's
opinion testimony which was based on statistical data concerning the
frequency of truck engine fires. The court stated that the trial court's
inquiry into whether the data was reasonably relied on must be made
on a case-by-case basis and should focus on the reliability of the expert's
opinion and its foundation. The factors used to measure the reliability
of the data, included whether the data was part of a published study or
prepared strictly in anticipation of litigation, presented in a formal manner into evidence, and gathered pursuant to an explained method. 35
In Wilder Enterprises, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp.,36 the
(E.D.N.Y. 1985) (expert testimony excluded under FRE 703 because expert physician relied upon plaintiff's hearsay checklists providing medical information).
31. See Wilder Enterprises, Inc. v. Allied Artists Pictures Corp., 632 F.2d 1135, 1143-44
(4th Cir. 1980) (expert economist's testimony was properly excluded in antitrust action
where he testified based on local real estate values without having a real estate expert to
verify the values); In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1267, 1281
(E.D.N.Y. 1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987) (expert testimony excluded as not reasonably relied on because the expert relied almost exclusively on hearsay information
without examining the victim); Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 529 F.2d 259, 271 (8th Cir. 1976),
cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976) (expert testimony allowed concerning automobile roof
support in negligence and strict liability case).

32. See Wilder Enterprises,632 F.2d at 1143-44.
33. In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig., 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1244 (E.D.N.Y. 1985),
aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
34. 714 F.2d 498 (5th Cir. 1983).
35. Id. at 503-04.

36. 632 F.2d 1135 (4th Cir. 1980).
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Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's exclusion of an expert economist's testimony under FRE 703 in an antitrust case. The expert, who
admitted he was not an expert in local real estate values, made calculations based on local real estate values. There were no facts presented to
support his calculations and no proof offered to show that his calculations and the underlying data were of a type reasonably relied on by ex37
perts in the local real estate valuation field.

In Polk v. Ford Motor Co., 38 plaintiff's expert testified concerning a
defective roof support based on the number of times a car rolled over in
an accident. In upholding the trial court's decision to admit the expert's
testimony, the court stated that "[t]here must, of course, be sufficient
facts already in evidence or disclosed by the witness as a result of his
investigation to take such testimony out of the realm of guesswork and
'39
speculation.
In Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,40 plaintiff's expert
used a computer model to estimate the future earnings of the deceased
in a wrongful death action. The court held the expert was qualified to
make computer model projections, but those projections required a
stronger basis than simple arithmetic computations to qualify under
FRE 703.41 For example, no foundation was established for using a constant income tax rate in the calculations. 42
Although it seems that courts making an inquiry under FRE 703
should focus on what experts in the field rely on, they often tend to focus on facts in the record and the foundation for the expert's opinion.
For this reason, a party may be forced to disclose more of the underlying facts of a computer simulation than would otherwise be necessary.
While this may provide some help for opposing counsel in cross-examination, the complexity of computer simulations usually makes this disclosure inadequate to prepare opposing counsel to cross-examine
experts without extensive pretrial discovery.
C.

DISCOVERY UNDER FRE 612

FRE 61243 provides that where a witness uses a document to refresh his memory for testifying, an adverse party may require the document to be produced and cross-examine the witness concerning it. FRE
612 applies when the witness uses the writing either "(1) while testify37.

38.
39.
40.
1984).
41.
42.

Id. at 1143-44.

529 F.2d 259 (8th Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 907 (1976).
Id at 271.
574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983), aff'd in part, rev'd in part, 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir.
Id at 1410.
Id

43. FED. R. EVID. 612 states in relevant part:
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ing, or (2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is
necessary in the interests of justice. . .

."4

FRE 612 applies both when

45
the witness testifies in a deposition and at trial.
The purpose of FRE 612 is to assist opposing counsel in free and
well-informed cross-examination of witnesses.4 If a witness uses the
document to refresh his memory at trial, the document must be produced as a matter of right. If used before trial, then the court must exercise its discretion in determining whether to require production of the
document. This is to prevent opposing counsel from engaging in a "fishing expedition" of the documents that the witness used in preparing for
trial. 47 It is reasonable to expect that an expert will review documents
that he used in forming his opinions before testifying. The documents
may involve numerous details, and the expert may be called to testify a
substantial period of time after he used the documents in forming his
opinion.
There is very little case law dealing with the application of FRE 612
to experts. In civil cases, FRE 612 has little impact on the production of
documents used by experts because of the broad scope of pre-trial discovery of experts authorized by FRCP 26(b)(4)(A). 48 However, if a document is denied discovery under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii), and is used by
an expert to refresh his memory while testifying, then FRE 612 requires that the document be produced. If the expert uses the document
prior to testifying, then the court should balance the possibility of more
effective cross-examination with the harm caused to the producing
party. Where the expert uses a specific document to prepare to testify,
there is more reason to compel production than where the facts are
known to experts in general. Because of this, a judge may properly require production under FRE 612, even if it would not be required under
FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
When the writing used by a witness is privileged by the work product doctrine, there is a tension between the polices of requiring produc49
tion under FRE 612 and refusing production under FRCP 26(b)(3).

[I]f
a witness uses a writing to refresh his memory for the purposes of testifying,
either(1) while testifying, or
(2) before testifying, if the court in its discretion determines it is necessary
in the interests of justice,
an adverse party is entitled to have the writing produced at the hearing, to inspect it, to cross-examine the witness thereon, and to introduce in evidence those
portions which relate to the testimony of the witness.
44. FED. R. EVID. 612.

45. See In re Comair Air Disaster Litig., 100 F.R.D. 350 (E.D. Ky. 1983).
46. Id. at 353.
47. FED. R. EvID. 612 (Judiciary Committee's report).
48. See infira text accompanying notes 76-98, for a discussion of FRCP 26(b)(4)(A).
49. See infra text accompanying notes 100-112, for a discussion of Rule 26(b)(3).
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The concern is that a party's lawyer could shape an expert witness's testimony with items of work product and then prevent effective rebuttal
of the expert's testimony by denying access to the items.50 The court in
In re ComairAir DisasterLitigation reasoned that "without reviewing
these materials opposing counsel 'cannot know or inquire into the extent to which witnesses' testimony has been shaded by counsel's presentation of the factual background.' ",51 The Berkey court stated that in
some cases the work product doctrine could be waived or qualified,
"where an attempt is made to exceed decent limits of preparation" or
52
concealment.
D.

RESTRICTING TESTIMONY UNDER

FRE 403

3

FRE 4035 provides that relevant evidence may be excluded at trial
if "its probative value is substantially outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues, or misleading the jury, or by considerations of undue delay, waste of time, or needless presentation of
cumulative evidence." There are several instances in which FRE 403
could appropriately be used to exclude the testimony of an expert concerning a computer simulation. FRE 403 can be used to exclude an expert from voluntarily presenting evidence and from involuntarily
answering an opposing counsel's question on cross-examination because
one of the FRE 403 dangers substantially outweighs the probative value
of the evidence.
Two scenarios illustrate how juries can be mislead regarding expert's testimony about a computer simulation. One scenario is where an
expert is not required to disclose the underlying basis for his simulation, misleading the jury as to the results of a severly flawed computer
program. Computer simulations generally involve a degree of mathematical sophistication not easily comprehended by most jurors. 54 Experts typically have impressive credentials and speak persuasively.5 5 In
many cases, opposing counsel might have been able to expose the flaws
in the simulation if permitted to cross-examine the expert about them.
A second scenario is where an expert is required to disclose the
50. Berkey Photo, Inc. v. Eastman Kodak Co., 74 F.R.D. 613 (S.D.N.Y. 1977).
51. 100 F.R.D. 350, 353 (E.D. Ky. 1983) (quoting James Julian, Inc. v. Raymtheon Co.,
93 F.R.D. 138, 146 (D. Del. 1982)) (aircraft owner entitled to production of manufacturer's
accident report used by expert to prepare for deposition).

52. Berkey, 74 F.R.D. at 617.
53. FED. R. EVID. 403.

54. See Perma Research & Dev. v. Singer, 542 F.2d 111, 121-26 (2d Cir. 1976), cert. denied, 429 U.S. 987 (1976). Cf.City of Cleveland v. Cleveland Electric Illuminating Co., 538
F. Supp. 1257, 1266-67 (N.D. Ohio 1980) (stating that computer simulations are generally
complicated and confusing).
55. See In re "Agent Orange" Prod. Liab. Litig. 611 F. Supp. 1223, 1256 (E.D.N.Y.
1985), aff'd, 818 F.2d 187 (2d Cir. 1987).
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simulation in detail on cross-examination. The jury may be confused by
the technical difficulty of the simulation, and may decide the facts
based on inappropriate reasons. Some courts restrict cross-examination
when the jury does not possess the requisite level of comprehension.
While trial courts are reluctant to exclude relevant evidence,
"[e]xclusion of evidence of low probative value is particularly appropriate when admission would result in expenditures of substantial trial
time and jury confusion."
Courts have refused to allow expert testimony where "[e]stablishing the testimony's low probative value would
embroil the jury in a protracted and fruitless inquiry into complex
57
issues."
In order to avoid the dangers illustrated in the scenarios and the
possibility of exclusion of evidence under FRE 403, opposing counsel
must be prepared for cross-examination of experts. For reasons of judicial economy, that preparation must occur prior to trial.
E.

LACK OF ATTORNEY PREPARATION

Where an attorney has not properly prepared himself to cross-examine an expert witness, courts generally will not provide extra time
for preparation. In Abernathy v. Superior Hardwood, Inc.,58 plaintiff
used a medical expert to testify concerning plaintiff's back injury. At
trial, defendant argued that plaintiff's expert witness should not have
been allowed to testify concerning the results of an electromyograph
test, because defendant's counsel did not have a reasonable opportunity
to prepare for cross-examination or to introduce rebuttal testimony.
The trial court refused both to exclude the expert's testimony and to
grant a continuance to allow defendant's counsel time to prepare rebuttal testimony. The trial judge stated that he did not think the expert's
testimony had a significant impact on the jury, and had a continuance
been granted, the judge would have had to postpone his next trial.5 9
The Seventh Circuit upheld the trial court's decision noting that
"in most cases... surprise is a poor reason to exclude expert testimony,
or to recess a trial for the purpose of allowing rebuttal testimony to be
obtained... when FRCP 26(b)(4) makes it so easy to get pretrial discovery of the other side's expert evidence." 6 The court also noted the
need for an attorney to retain his own expert to help prepare for trial.
"A lawyer who undertakes to cross-examine a medical expert without
having his own expert at his elbow has only himself to blame if the wit56.
57.
58.
59.
60.

Id, at 1255.
Id, at 1283.
704 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1983).
Id at 969.

Id
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ness utters some arcanum that the lawyer cannot understand."'61
Courts must have discretion to control what an expert discloses at
trial for judicial economy and to avoid misleading or confusing the jury.
Opposing counsel must obtain extensive discovery of the underlying
facts of a computer simulation prior to trial for effective crossexamination.
II.

PRETRIAL DISCOVERY OF EXPERTS

Part I demonstrated that in order to promote judicial economy and
to avoid jury confusion, trial courts may restrict disclosure by experts
upon cross-examination. However, where opposing counsel is properly
prepared for trial by thoroughly understanding the expert's computer
simulation in advance of trial, he should be able to present evidence and
conduct cross-examination in an orderly and effective manner. The result is a reduction in wasted trial time and minimum jury confusion.
Part II of this Note argues that extensive pretrial discovery of experts
should be liberally permitted within the context of FRCP 26(b)(4)(A).
FRC 26-37 provide for pretrial discovery and depositions. These
rules were "intended to insure 'proper litigations, ... making the trial
less a game of blindman's bluff and more a fair contest with the basic
issues and facts disclosed to the fullest practicable extent.' "62 In the
landmark case Hickman v. Taylor,6 3 the Supreme Court stated that the
deposition-discovery rules should be interpreted to enable "parties to
obtain the fullest possible knowledge of the issues and facts before
trial." 64 The notes of the Advisory Committee to FRE 705, allowing an
expert to testify without disclosing underlying facts and data, states that
effective cross-examination depends on the substantial pretrial discov65
ery provided for by FRCP 26(b)(4).
FRCP 26 contains general provisions governing discovery. FRCP
26(b)(4) 66 provides guidelines for the discovery of experts in prepara61. Id.
62. Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 643 F.2d 670, 674 (9th Cir. 1981) (quoting United States
v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958)) (citations omitted).
63. 329 U.S. 495 (1947).
64. Id at 501 (attorney for defendant was not required to produce statements made
by personal injury survivors during the attorney's interviews).
65. FED. R. EVID. 705 (Advisory Committee's notes).

66. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) states:
Discovery of facts known and opinions held by experts, otherwise discoverable
under the provisions of subdivision (b)(1) of this rule and acquired or developed
in anticipation of litigation or for trial, may be obtained only as follows:
(A)(i) A party may through interrogatories require any other party to identify each person whom the other party expects to call as an expert witness at
trial, to state the subject matter on which the expert is expected to testify, and to
state the substance of the facts and opinions to which the expert is expected to
testify and a summary of the grounds for each opinion. (ii) Upon motion, the
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tion for trial. FRCP 26(b)(4) is generally interpreted to "override and
limit the more general provisions of the remaining discovery machinery
described in FRCP 27 through 37.1'67 Although some cases hold to the
contrary, FRCP 26(b)(3), 8 which governs work product protection, is
not applicable in limiting discovery of material, such as a computer simulation, prepared by an expert in anticipation of trial.69 "FRCP 26(b)(4)
sets down the sole method by which discovery of facts known and opin'70
ions held by experts" may be obtained.
FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) concerns discovery of experts who are expected
to testify at trial. FRCP 26(4)(A)(i) provides that a party may through
interrogatories require any other party to 1) identify each expert who
the party intends to call at trial, 2) state the subject matter on which
the witness is expected to testify, and 3) state the substance of the facts
and opinions to which the expert is expected to testify and a summary
of the grounds for each opinion. FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) states that upon
motion, the court may order further discovery by other means, e.g., deposition. This Note argues that through FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) courts
should allow liberal discovery of experts who are expected to testify at
trial.
A.

REQUIREMENTS OF

FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i)

Very little case law dealing with the requirements for FRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(i) exists. 7 1 The requirement of identifying experts is relatively straightforward. However, the degree to which a party is required to state the subject matter, the substance of the facts and
opinions, and a summary of the grounds of the opinion is not clear.
In Hockley v. Zent, Inc.,72 the court determined that to satisfy the
FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) requirement it is necessary to "state the substance
of the facts and opinions to which an expert is expected to testify and a
summary of the grounds for each opinion. '73 The court noted that
court may order further discovery by other means, subject to such restrictions as
to scope and such provisions, pursuant to subdivision (b)(4)(C) of this rule, concerning fees and expenses as the court may deem appropriate.
67. Seiffer v. Topsy's International, Inc., 69 F.R.D. 69, 72 (D. Kan. 1975).
68. See infra text accompanying notes 100-112.
69. See Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303 (E.D. Pa. 1983); Graham, Discovery of Experts Under Rule 26(b)(4) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure:
Part One, an Analytical Study, 1976 U. ILL. L.F. 895, 923-29 (1976).
70. Shackelford v. Vermeer Mfg. Co., 93 F.R.D. 512, 513 (W.D. Tex. 1982); see also
Beverage Marketing Corp. v. Ogilvy & Mather Direct Response, Inc., 563 F. Supp. 1013,
1014 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
71. See Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 30 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (court held that the
discovering party must file FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) motion to compel discovery to obtain
further discovery).
72. 89 F.R.D. 26 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
73. Id.
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FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) interrogatories "are designed to afford the questioner notice of the basic arguments the responding litigant intends to
press at trial. '74 In addition, the court quoted a Second Circuit opinion
stating that "'[t]he policy which prompted amendment to FRCP
26(b)(4) . . .to allow more liberal discovery of potential expert testimony was ... intended to make the task of the trier of fact more manageable by means of an orderly presentation of complex issues of
fact.' "75
B.

REQUIREMENTS OF

FRCP 26(B)(4)(A)(ii)

Courts take a wide variety of views on the showing that a party
must make to have a FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) motion granted. The extent
of the discovery allowed under Rule 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) also varies. The
language of FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) provides essentially no direction, "del'76
egating the question entirely to the discretion of the court.
Courts generally take the view that requests for interrogatories
under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i) must be made before the court will grant a
motion for further discovery under the rule.77 This seems to be a valid
requirement since answers to interrogatories provide direction for further discovery, increasing the efficiency of the discovery process. Some
courts require the opposing party to completely answer the interrogatory before granting a motion for further discovery. 78 This appears
inappropriate because it encourages the opposing party to provide inappropriate answers to interrogatories to stall the requesting party's
discovery.
Two rationales exist for limiting discovery of experts who testify at
trial. First, discovery of documents prepared by an expert is subject to
the special showing of need that is required under FRCP 26(b)(3). 79
This argument fails because the discovery of documents prepared by experts is not governed by FRCP 26(b)(3).8 0
Second, it is unfair to have one party pay for an expert to prepare
for trial while the discovery party takes advantage of the preparation
without bearing the expense.8 ' FRCP 26(b)(4)(c) provides the solution
74. Id
75. Id. (quoting Weiss v. Chrysler Motors Corp., 513 F.2d 449, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1975)).
76. Herbst v. Int'l Tel. & Tel. Corp., 65 F.R.D. 528, 529 (D. Corn. 1975) (The court
noted that the comments of the advisory committee on the 1970 amendment to the rules
offers guidance on the exercise of this discretion).
77. See Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 29-31 (M.D. Pa. 1980).
78. Id.
79. Wilson v. Resnick, 51 F.R.D. 510, 511-12 (E.D. Pa. 1970).
80. See Graham, supra note 69, at 923-29.
81. See Smith v. Ford Motor Co., 626 F.2d 784, 792 (10th Cir. 1980) (includes a discussion of the historical development of FRCP 26(b)(4) in this context), reh'g denied, 626
F.2d 784 (10th Cir. 1980), cert. denied, 450 U.S. 918 (1981).

1987]

DISCLOSURE OF EXPERT COMPUTER

that the parties share the expense of the expert. "The language of
FRCP 26 suggests that experts hired solely to testify at trial are entitled
to no greater protection than any other witness, once the problem of allowing an adversary to receive the benefit of another's expert without
'8 2
cost to the adversary is resolved.
There are at least five persuasive reasons to allow liberal discovery
under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) of experts who are expected to testify at trial.
1.

Effective Cross-examinationRequires Advance Preparation

Notions of justice require that judges and juries have access to all
relevant information when deciding law and fact. "Mutual knowledge
of all the relevant facts gathered by both parties is essential to proper
'8 3
litigation.
FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) was designed to provide relevant information
through liberal discovery of experts in preparation for cross-examination at trial. The notes of the Advisory Committee to FRCP 26(b)(4)
state that "a prohibition against discovery of information held by expert
witnesses produces in acute form the very evils that discovery has been
created to prevent. Effective cross-examination of an expert witness requires advance preparation. '8 4 FRE 705, which governs the disclosure
of experts at trial, was also fashioned with the expectation of substantial pretrial discovery. The notes of the Advisory Committee to FRE
705 states that the practice of "leaving it to the cross-examinor to bring
out the supporting data" [underlying an expert's opinion,] "assumes that
the cross-examiner has the advance knowledge which is essential for effective cross-examination." The committee concludes that FRCP
26(b)(4) "obviat[es] in large measure the obstacles which have been
raised in some instances to discovery of findings, underlying data, and
even the identity of the experts. '8 5 ,
Even if an inordinate amount of time at trial is spent in cross-examination, there is little chance of presenting all of the pertinent information without advance preparation, including extensive discovery. This is
particularly true when computer simulations are involved. There are
many ways to mathematically approach a problem. "[A] lawyer even
with the help of his own experts frequently cannot anticipate the particular approach his adversary's expert will take or the data on which
8' 6
he will base his judgment on the stand.
82. Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 304 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
83. Hickman v. Taylor, 329 U.S. 495, 507 (1947).
84. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(4) (Advisory Committee's note).
85.

FED. R. EVID. 705 (Advisory Committee's note).

86. FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(4) (Advisory Committee's note).
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In a widely quoted law review article, Professor Friedenthal discussed the difficulties of preparing to cross-examine experts:
It is fundamental that opportunity be had for full cross-examination,
and this cannot be done properly in many cases without resort to pretrial discovery, particularly when expert witnesses are involved. Unlike two eye witnesses who disagree, two experts who disagree are not
necessarily basing their testimony on their views of the same objective
features. Instead they may rely on entirely separate data, since the
theoretical bases underlying their respective approaches may differ racially. Before an attorney can even hope to deal on cross-examination
with an unfavorable expert opinion he must have some idea of the bases of that opinion and the data relied upon. If the attorney is required
to await examination at trial to get this information, he often will have
too little time to recognize and expose vulnerable spots in the
87
testimony.
A significant and persuasive way to determine if a computer simulation is based on inaccurate assumptions is to compare the results of
the simulation with actual test data. When an opposing party discovers
the details of the simulation in advance of trial, it can make such comparisons. At trial, the opposing party can require the expert to justify
these discrepancies. Without extensive pretrial discovery of the underlying facts and data relied on in a computer simulation, including a copy
of the computer program, a lawyer can only be partially prepared to
cross-examine an expert.
2. Narrowing Issues and Trial Organization
Liberal pretrial discovery allows a party the time and information
necessary to prepare for an organized, orderly trial. This decreases jury
confusion and increases judicial economy. "The policy which prompted
amendment to FRCP 26(b)(4) ...to allow more liberal discovery of potential expert testimony... was intended to make the task of the trier
of fact more manageable by means of an orderly presentation of com88
plex issues of fact."
In City of Cleveland v. Ceveland Electric Illuminating Co.,8 9 the
court granted defendant's motion to compel pretrial production of data
and calculations underlying plaintiff's experts' reports based on computer simulations. The court noted the importance of pretrial discovery
in narrowing complex issues to prepare for cross-examination of experts at trial. 90 It held that where the expert reports were based on
87. Friedenthal, Discovery and Use of an Adverse Party's Expert Information, 14
STAN. L. REV. 455, 485 (1962).

88.
Motors
89.
90.

Hockley v. Zent, Inc., 89 F.R.D. 26, 30 (M.D. Pa. 1980) (quoting Weiss v. Chrysler
Corp., 515 F.2d 449, 456-57 (2d Cir. 1975)).
538 F. Supp. 1257 (N.D. Ohio 1980).
Id. at 1266.
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"complex data, calculations and computer simulations which are [not]
deducible from the written reports, [pretrial discovery of the underlying
details is essential to] effective and efficient examination of [the] experts at trial."9 1
3.

Trial Judges' Decisions Regarding Admissibility Under FRE 104(a)

Arguing effectively before a judge requires advance preparation.
Part I evidenced that a judge must make a preliminary decision
whether to admit evidence or allow experts to testify under FRE 104(a).
It is essential that opposing counsel be prepared to argue before the
judge.
In Shu-Tao Lin v. McDonnell Douglas Corp.,92 plaintiff's expert
used a computer model to estimate the future earnings of the deceased
in a wrongful death action. The trial court held that defendant did not
receive a fair trial because the expert's computer methodology and data
were not adequately disclosed during pretrial discovery.93 Agreeing
with the trial court, the appellate court noted that pretrial "discovery
not only affords the parties an opportunity to prepare cross-examination but also affords the district court an opportunity to assess the ad94
missibility of testimony before the jury hears it."
4. Preventinga Sanitized Trial
By allowing pretrial discovery of experts, an opposing party can get
the expert's data and facts on the record before trial. This will make it
more difficult for the expert to dishonestly change his opinion to match
95
later developments in the litigation or at trial.
5. EncouragingAccurate Settlements
A case is much more likely to properly settle before trial if the parties can assess the relative strengths of each party's position before
trial. 96 For reasons of judicial economy and fairness to the litigants, liberal discovery should be allowed to facilitate early and fair settlements.
For the five reasons given, extensive discovery of experts an opposing party expects to call should be liberally allowed. In explaining its
91. Id. at 1267.

92. 742 F.2d 45 (2d Cir. 1984).
93. 574 F. Supp. 1407 (S.D.N.Y. 1983).
94. Shu-tao, 742 F.2d at 48 n.3.
95. See Dennis v. BASF Wyandotte Corp., 101 F.R.D. 301, 303-04 (E.D. Pa. 1983); see

also Scott & Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 643 F.2d 670, 676 (9th Cir. 1981) (district court abused its
discretion in allowing undisclosed witness and exhibits, and use of a new theory of the
case).

96. Dennis, 101 F.R.D. at 303.
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reasons for allowing discovery of an expert, the court in Dennis97 gave
an excellent summary of the five above stated reasons:
By deposing the expert witness, trial counsel can far better assess the
value of the case. A deposition should improve the prospects of an amicable settlement, or if settlement is not reached, a greater likelihood of
a fair trial with all the relevant facts presented to a jury for its ultimate decision. It avoids trial by surprise. It further reduces the possibility that an expert witness may alter or amend his generalized
opinion to fit the evidence presented at trial (citation omitted). Finally,
taking the oral deposition
of plaintiff's expert witness in no way
98
prejudices plaintiff's case.
C.

EFFECT OF FRE 612

As discussed in Part I(C), 99 situations may exist where an expert
relies on documents to refresh his memory in preparation to testify
which documents have not previously been required to be produced
under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A). In that case, FRE 612 provides a more compelling reason to produce the document that does FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii),
because there is a greater likelihood that the document will be relevant
to the expert's testimony.
D.

EFFECT OF WORK PRODUCT-FRCP 26(B)(3)

The analysis used to determine whether an expert must disclose
facts he knows under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) is complicated where the facts
are attorney work-product under FRCP 26(b)(3). 100 The second sentence of FRCP 26(b)(3) provides that "the court shall protect against
disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney or other representative of a party concerning the
litigation."10 1 Where facts known to an expert are attorney work product, there is tension between the need for liberal discovery of experts
97. 101 F.R.D. 301 (E.D. Pa. 1983).
98. Id. at 303-04.
99. See supra text accompanying notes 43-52.
100. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(b)(3).
101. The second sentence of FRCP 26(b)(3) states: "In ordering discovery of such
materials when the required showing has been made, the court shall protect against disclosure of the mental impressions, conclusions, opinions, or legal theories of an attorney
or other representative of a party concerning the litigation." The first sentence of FRCP
26(b)(3) expressly does not limit discovery under FRCP 26(b)(4). It has been held that
the second sentence is not limited by FRCP 26(b)(4). See Bogosian v. Gulf Oil Corp., 738
F.2d 587, 594 (3d Cir. 1984). Some courts have applied the "substantial need" test of the
first sentence of FRCP 26(b)(3) in deciding whether materials given to experts containing
work product are discoverable. See, e.g., Baise v. Alewel's, Inc., 99 F.R.D. 95 (W.D. Mo.
1983) (defendant had not shown "substantial need" and "undue hardship" in motion to
compel discovery of expert's correspondence from counsel).
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under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) and the need to protect an attorney's work
product under FRCP 26(b)(3).
The major policy reason for protecting attorney work product, as
discussed in Hickman v. Taylor,10 2 is that were materials containing
lawyers' mental and legal impressions "open to opposing counsel on
mere demand, much of what is now put down in writing would remain
unwritten. 10 3 As a result, "[i]nefficiency, unfairness and sharp practices would inevitably develop in the giving of legal advice and in the
preparation of cases for trial .... [T]he interests of the clients and the
'10 4
cause of justice would be poorly served.
l0 5
In Boring v. Keller, to prepare for being deposed, defendant's expert inadvertently received an unedited version of defendant's attorney's summary of plaintiff's deposition. Plaintiff sought to inspect a
copy of the document, but defendant refused claiming work-product
protection. In requiring defendant to produce the document, the court
reasoned that while opinion work product is normally given a very high
degree of immunity, "it is subject to discovery when the need for such
information is at issue and compelling.' 10 6 The court gave two reasons
opinion work product is not protected where it has been used by an expert to formulate his opinion. First, the work product privilege may be
waived where counsel gives work product to an expert to influence and
shape his testimony and counsel subsequently withholds the material
from the opposing party. Second, withholding information after it has
been used to shape the expert's opinion frustrates the policy of allowing
10 7
preparation for effective cross-examination in FRCP 26(b)(4)(A).
A different approach was taken by the court in Bogosian v. Gulf
Oil Corp., l0 8 in which the Third Circuit held that the plaintiff in an antitrust suit was not required under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) to produce documents shown to an expert that constituted work product. The court
first established that showing the documents to an expert did not waive
the work product privilege. 10 9 It next noted that the second sentence of
FRCP 26(b)(3) is not limited by FRCP 26(b)(4). 110 Finally, the court
held that cross-examination could be "comprehensive and effective"
when questioning the basis of an expert's opinion without having access
to the lawyer's work product used in assisting the expert in formulating
102. 329 U.S. 495 (1947) (attorney for defendant not required to produce statements
made by personal injury survivors during the attorney's interviews).
103. Id. at 511.

104. Id.
105. 97 F.R.D. 404 (D. Colo. 1983).
106.
107.
108.
109.
110.

Id. at 407.
Id. at 407-08.
738 F.2d 587 (3d Cir. 1984) (Becker, J., dissenting).
Id. at 593.
Id at 594.
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his opinion."'
The approach in Boring v. Keller is more desirable because under
the second sentence of FRE 705112 the expert will probably be required
to disclose the underlying facts and data supporting his conclusions. In
order to promote advance preparation for cross-examination of experts,
the work-product privilege should be waived where there is a strong
reason to believe that the expert has substantially relied on the privileged information.
III.

Restricting Non-Disclosed Expert Evidence

For reasons of fairness and judicial economy, a party should be precluded from introducing evidence at trial that was not seasonably disclosed before trial after a proper FRCP 26(b)(4)(A) request was made.
This conclusion follows from Parts I and II because without restricting
the introduction of undisclosed evidence at trial, a party could effectively undermine the policies behind liberal discovery to facilitate efficient and effective cross-examination of experts at trial.
FRCP 26(e)(1)(B)" i 3 requires a party to seasonably supplement its
response to a request for discovery, with respect to questions answered
under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(i), with information obtained after the answer. i i 4 FRCP 26(e)(3) gives the court power to impose a duty to supplement responses. A court should impose the duty with respect to
discovery required by FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
Tests used by courts in deciding whether to exclude an expert from
testifying with evidence that was not properly disclosed "are intimately
tied to factual questions of prejudice, surprise ... and the effect upon
the progress of the trial" caused by allowing or disallowing the testimony." i 5 Whether to exclude expert testimony is "not capable of resoi i6
lution generically or in a factual void.""
In Meyers v. Pennypack Woods Home Ownership Assoc.,i i 7 the
111. Id at 595.
112. See supra text accompanying notes 14-21.
113. FED. R. Civ. P. 26(e)(1)(B) states:
Supplementation of Responses. A party who has responded to a request for discovery with a response that was complete when made is under no duty to supplement his response to include information therafter acquired, except as follows:
(1)(B) the identity of each person expected to be called as an expert witness at
trial, the subject matter on which he is expected to testify, and the substance of
his testimony.
114. See FED. R. Civ. P. 26(c) (Advisory Committee's note).
115. Stacey v. Bangor Punta Corp., 107 F.R.D. 786, 789 (D. Me. 1985) (court refused to
consider restricting expert testimony until after a party calls an expert witness offering
nondisclosed testimony).
116. I& at 789.
117. 559 F.2d 894 (3d Cir. 1977) (trial court abused its discretion in excluding two ex-
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court enumerated the following four basic considerations to be used in
deciding whether to limit or exclude expert testimony:
(1) the prejudice or surprise in fact of the party against whom the excluded witnesses would have testified, (2) the ability of that party to
cure the prejudice, (3) the extent to which waiver of the rule against
calling unlisted witnesses would disrupt the orderly and efficient trial
of the case or of other cases in the court, and (4) bad faith or willful1 18
ness in failing to comply with the court's order.
The court should use its discretion in weighing these considerations, except where there is willful concealment of expert information.
In that case, the expert should not be allowed to testify concerning the
information, absent the most compelling circumstances.
In Scott and Fetzer Co. v. Dile, 119 the Ninth Circuit held that the
district court abused its discretion in allowing plaintiff to call an expert
witness at trial where plaintiff did not give notice of the identity of the
witness until after trial had begun. The lack of notice denied defendant
his right to prepare for effective cross-examination and rebuttal. 120 In
Scott, plaintiff knew that it would call the expert witness after the time
of their initial answer to interrogatories but before trial. Plaintiff
claimed it did not give a supplemental response because it was waiting
for defendant to reciprocate with a simultaneous supplemental response. The Ninth Circuit noted that FRCP 26(e) does not require simultaneous supplementation of answers to interrogatories. 12 1 The
withholding of evidence was held willful and substantially prejudicial to
the defendant.
In Gorby v. Schneider Tank Lines, Inc.,122 defendant-appellant deliberately refrained from disclosing a particular statement to its experts
until after their depositions had been taken. The trial judge refused to
allow the expert's testimony concerning the statement. In affirming the
trial court's ruling, the Seventh Circuit stated that the lack of disclosure
created an unfair surprise and impaired the appellee's ability to prepare
an effective rebuttal, which were "two of the evils FRCP 26(b)(4)
'12 3
sought to eliminate.
Abernathy v. Superior Hardwood, Inc.124 takes a more liberal view
of admitting previously undisclosed evidence. In Abernathy, plaintiff
performed a test one week before trial and did not inform defendant
pert witnesses offered by plaintiff on the ground that they were not listed in pretrial
memorandum in racial discrimination case).
118. Id at 904-05.
119. 643 F.2d 670 (9th Cir. 1981).
120. Id,at 673.
121. Id at 673-74.
122. 741 F.2d 1015 (7th Cir. 1984).
123. Id at 1019.
124. 704 F.2d 963 (7th Cir. 1983) (personal injury action).
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the test had been made or of its positive result until one half hour
before trial was scheduled to begin. Defendant's counsel did not object
to proceeding with the trial. Defendant was given a copy of the test results the next day. At trial, the judge refused to either exclude the expert's testimony concerning the test or to grant a continuance of trial to
give defendant time to prepare for rebuttal. In affirming the trial
court's decision, the Seventh Circuit noted that pretrial discovery is
easy to obtain under FRCP 26(b)(4), and that plaintiff's expert had indicated during a deposition (approximately one month before trial) that
he might perform the test. The court stated that defendant's counsel
"could have sought a commitment from plaintiff's counsel to make the
results of any such test available to him well before trial, but he did
not. 12 5
The court's holding in Abernathy places a high burden on opposing
counsel to request specific evidence before trial. This is inappropriate
because the party calling the expert is in a superior position to understand its own test results. Judges should routinely place the burden for
supplementing FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii) responses through FRCP 26(e)(3)
orders, and acknowledging the burden for supplementing FRCP
26(b)(4)(A)(i) responses required by FRCP 26(e)(1)(B) on the calling
party.
CONCLUSION
Effective cross-examination of expert witnesses requires advance
preparation. This is particularly true where the expert uses computer
simulations, because of the variety of methods and approaches that can
be used to mathematically model or simulate a phenomenon. The court
should have the flexibility to control the amount of detail that an expert witness is required to provide on cross-examination at trial. Extensive pretrial discovery should be allowed under FRCP 26(b)(4)(A)(ii).
Judicial economy and fairness rationales require a party to be foreclosed from introducing evidence at trial that was not seasonably disclosed before trial provided it is properly requested.
Alan Aldous

125. Id. at 969-70.

